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EVIDENCE-ADAISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS BY AN AL-
LEGED AGENT INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT TO
ESTABLISH AGENCY.
It is a well-recognized general rule that the fact of agency
cannot be established by the extra-judicial statements, admissions,
or declarations of the alleged agent,' although it is equally true that
the agent is a competent witness to prove the agency, when it rests
in parol.
Assuming that the agent does not testify however, or denies
the fact of agency it frequently happens, in an action arising as the
result of an accident, that the injured party will have available little
or no proof that the other party involved in the accident was an agent
of the defendant or was acting in that capacity In such a situation
a pre-trial statement by the one involved, regarding his employment
by or agency for the defendant, if admissible, could be of great value
in establishing the fact of agency
In refusing to allow such statements, some courts consider it
sufficient to declare that they are excluded by the hearsay rule.
Professor Wigmore states that use of the alleged agent's hearsay
assertions for the purpose of establishing the fact of agency would be
begging the question' and remarks that "This is never disputed,
except by those counsel who have to receive elementary training at
the hands of the Supreme Court. ' Nonetheless, there are occasions
when, for one reason or another, a declaration made by one involved
in an accident in relation to his employment by or agency for another
person will be admitted in evidence to establish the agency.
By far the most frequent situation where such a statement is
admitted is where it "was part of the res gestae."' In such a case,
'MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) sec. 285.
'Montgomery Production Credit Ass'n. v M. Hohenberg & Co.,
31 Ala. App. 117, 12 So. 2d 865 (1943) Rhodes v Edward K. Tryon
Co., 132 Fla. 880, 182 So. 301 (1938) Key v Thomas Lyons Co.,
109 Kan. 281, 198 Pac. 928 (1921) Munn v. Mid-Continent Motor
Securities Co., 126 Okla. 241, 259 Pac. 249 (1927) MECHEM, LAW OF
AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) sec. 291.
'Hackney v Dudley 216 Ala. 400, 113 So. 401 (1927) Du Bois
v. Powdrell, 271 Mass. 394, 171 N.E. 474 (1930) Dafoe v. Grantski,
143 Neb. 344, 9 N.W 2d 488 (1943).
4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1078.
Id. at sec. 1078, n. 5.
'The phrase has been variously translated, defined, and applied.
As used in this group of cases it apparently means any spontaneous
exclamation, by a participant or witness of the accident. For other
applications, see 1 JONES, EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) sec. 344, who
defines the term as meaning "transactions" or "things done" and
adds that " with reference to hearsay evidence it is rather
loosely used to describe declarations, exclamations, acts or conduct
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however, it is usually required that there be some other evidence to
support the finding of agency. Typical of this type of decision is
Piedmont Operating Co. v. Cummings in which the court states:
"Where there is evidence from which the fact of agency may be
inferred, the declarations of the agent as to facts tending to establish
the agency when made as part of the res gestae, are relevant and
admissible."' The amount and type of the requisite "other evidence"
indicates a wide diversity of opinion on the part of the courts.
In Anming v. Rothschild8 it was held that ownership of the car,
while raising a presumption of agency, was not sufficient of itself
to allow admission of a declaration by the driver. A Maryland court
also recognized this presumption, but ownership, coupled with the
fact that the driver often drove the same truck on company business
and that he had on this occasion been told by a department manager
(who may or may not have had the authority) to use the truck, plus
of course an admission at the time of the accident by the driver, was
held insufficient to avoid a directed verdict for the defendant.'
Contrasted with these are the cases of Maynard v. Hall' and
Lowie v. Dixie' Stores, Inc. ' where the only additional evidence was
that the defendant in the one case, and the manager of the defendant
in the other, had put up bond for the appearance at court of the
driver of the car. This single act, which might have been the
spontaneous gesture of a friend of the driver, or of a professional
bondsman for that matter, was sufficient reason for a ruling that the
driver's statement was properly admitted as part of the res gestae.
In the latter case there was the additional factor that the declaration
of the driver was made in response to a question put to him at the
scene of the accident, a circumstance which caused the Michigan
court to exclude a similar statement.
1 2
The time interval often plays a large part in determining the
admissibility of such a statement with those courts which employ
the "res gestae" language. Here, too, the divergence of opinion is
of a participant in or witness of the principal transaction in suit, the
statements or acts being such as tend to explain or illustrate the
transaction which they accompany " Sparks Bus Line, Inc. v.
Spears, 276 Ky 600, 604, 124 S.W 2d 1031, 1034 (1939) Schroeder
v. Rawlinss. 344 Mo. 630, - 127 S.W 2d 678, 681 (1939).
40 Ga. App. 397, 149 S.E. 814, 815 (1929) Accord, Schlick v
Berg, 205 Minn. 465. 286 N.W 356 (1939), Stover v. Mackie, 170
Okla. 574. 41 P 2d 474 (1935)
8130 Wash 232, 226 Pac. 1013 (1924).
'Wells v. Hect & Co., 155 Md. 618, 142 Atl. 258 (1928).
"61 Ariz. 49, 143 P 2d 884 (1943).
"172 S.C. 468, 174 S.E. 394 (1934).
"Sheathelm v. Consumers Power Co., 280 Mich. 106, 273 N.W
410 (1937).
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marked, for, though it is well recognized that the statement must
be contemporaneous, there is no standard of application."
The statements of the alleged agent have sometimes been ad-
mitted on grounds other than the traditional justification that they
"form part of the res gestae." In Du Bots v. Powdrell' a statement
made by the minor driver of an automobile immediately after an
accident to the effect that his mother had sent him to make a tele-
phone call was admitted without objection being made. After pointing
out this fact and acknowledging that such statements normally are
inadmissible as admissions by the agent binding on the principal,
without independent evidence of the authority of the alleged agent
to make them and of evidence that they were brought home to the
alleged principal, the court states that " it was entitled to its
natural probative force as tending to show by a statement of the
minor defendant, but not as an admission on the part of his mother,
that he was driving the automobile on an errand for her when the
plaintiff was injured." " They are also admissible, of course, as self-
contradictions of the alleged agent's testimony on the stand."
When the statement is made to an insurance company or in
compliance with a statute requiring a report by one involved in
the accident, the report will not be admitted to prove the agency,
unless the driver is acting as the agent of the principal in making
the report." If the report was made, not by the agent, but by a police
officer, for instance, who did not witness the accident, it is inad-
missible as hearsay "
" Siebel v. Shapiro, 58 Cal. App. 2d 509, 137 P 2d 56 (1943)
(admitted-five minutes) Renfro v Central Coal & Coke Co., 233
Mo. App. 1219, 19 S.W 2d 766 (1929) (inadmissible- " whether
15 minutes or three hours was after the accident. ") Barz
v. Fleischman Yeast Co., 308 Mo. 288, 271 S.W 361 (1925) (admitted
-30 minutes to one hour) Moore v Rosenmond, 238 N.Y. 356, 144
N.E. 639 (1924) (extent of time not considered- " narrative of
past event, no part of the accident itself, was pure hearsay ") Snipes
v. Augusta-Aiken Ry & Electric Corp., 151 S.C. 391, 149 S.E. 111
(1929) (first made immediately after the accident, and repeated
" some time later when approached by the plaintiff in an
effort to settle the cause"-" although not a part of the res gestae
as to the immediate transaction, a part of the res gestae as to the
general transaction in its entirety ")
"271 Mass. 394, 171 N.E. 474 (1930).
"Id. at - 171 N.E. at 476.
"Craft v. Koonce, 237 Ala. 552, 187 So. 730 (1939) Otero v. Soto,
34 Ariz. 87, 267 Pac. 947 (1928).
"'Voegeli v. Waterbury Yellow Cab Co., 111 Conn. 407, 150 Atl.
303 (1930).
" Guberman v Weiner, 10 Cal. App. 2d 401, 51 P 2d 1141 (1935).
"Duffey v Curtis, 193 Minn. 358, 258 N.W 744 (1935) Needle
v N.Y. Railways Corp., 227 App. Div. 276, 237 N.Y. Supp. 547
(1929) Cf. Gibbons v Perkins, 132 Misc. 583, 230 N.Y. Supp. 273
(1928) (where a self-serving report was admitted).
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Statements manifesting intent have been admitted to show that
the agent was, at the time of the accident, acting within the scope
of his employment. The Missouri court considered the state of mind
of the agent to be a point in issue and, in view of a conflict as to
whether he was, at the time, acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, admitted a statement made by the agent after the accident
as to where he was going at the time. The court stated that, the only
way the intention could be proved " was by some outward
manifestation by him of his intentions, by deed or word. Since there
was no manifestation by deed the only evidence left was proof
of his manifestation by word" and, quoting from CORPUS JURIS
SECUNDUM, "Such evidence is admissible, not as a part of the res
gestae. but as a fact relevant to a fact in issue." '
A statement made by an employee in the presence of the manager
of the company after being arrested in connection with the accident,
that he had been directed to operate the vehicle by the manager was
admitted in a late Georgia case 2' on the dual ground that it was
part of the res gestae and that it was made in the presence of the
manager of the company despite the fact that the manager imme-
diately denied having given such authority.
Although a declaration which is expressly authorized by the
principal should be admissible, since this is clearly within the course
of his employment, the question remains as to what should be the
basis of admission in other situations. To depend solely on the
evidentiary test for spontaneous exclamations is to ignore the fact
of agency or the application of its rules. It is not enough to speak
in terms of "res gestae" and, if this test be met, admit the declaration
and hope it will be used by a jury in its proper function, be it
evidence or agency Nor is it wise merely to render lip service to the
rule that the fact of agency must be shown in order to admit such
declarations as a rule of agency- if used in this connection there
should be recognized the requirement that this fact of agency actually
be shown, and the declaration then be coupled with clear instructions
regarding its proper purpose. -
As to what that purpose is, Professor Wigmore sets forth a clear
pronouncement:
"He who sets another person to do an act in his
stead as agent is chargeable in substantive law by such
acts as are done under that authority- so too, properly
enough, admissions made by .the agent in the course of
exercising that authority have the same testimomal
- Mattan v Hoover Co., 350 Mo. 506, 166 S.W 2d 557 (1942)
-'American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v McWilliams, 55 Ga. App.
658, 191 S.E. 191 (1937) Cf. Dudley v. Preston Motor Co., 51 F 2d 8
(C.C.A. 6th 1931) (where the company officer did not make such
denial and the statement was held inconclusive.)
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value to discredit the party's present claim as if stated
by the party himself.
"The question therefore turns upon the scope of
the authority This question, frequently enough a diffi-
cult one, depends upon the doctrine of Agency applied
to the circumstances of the case, and not upon any rule
of Evidence."2
It would appear, then, that there are two possibilities for allow-
ing such statements and admissions by an agent to be introduced.
(1) They may be admitted as an exception to the Hearsay Rule
which, if correctly considered, will make the fact of agency im-
material, for agency is not then involved and the statement is
admissible, not because made by an agent, but under the general
rules of Evidence.' (2) They may be admitted as having been made
by an agent acting within the scope of his employment; however, it
is then necessary to establish clearly the fact of agency and that the
person was, at the time of making the statement, acting within the
course of his employment.' If these requirements be met the time
and circumstances will present no difficulty One of the clearest
statements of this distinction is the dissenting opinion of Judge
Cothran in Snipes v. Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Electrzc Corp. in which
he said:
"There is quite a good deal of confusion of thought
and lack of discrimination manifest in the treatment of
the subject of the admissibility of declarations of an
agent. The lack of discrimination and consequent con-
fusion of thought is demonstrated by the failure to
differentiate between the declarations of an agent which
were part of the res gestae and those declarations which
are made in the course of his employment, and while the
matter in controversy was actually pending. The declar-
ations of an agent, which are shown to have been a
part of the res gestae, are admitted, not because he was
an agent, but because they come within the class of
excepted hearsay evidence which fulfills the require-
ments of the res gestae rule; the declarations of one
not an agent would be received under the same condi-
tions. The declarations of an agent made within the
course of his employment and while the matter in
controversy was pending, are admitted, not because they
mere [were?] made as part of the res gestae, but because
they were made under the circumstances stated. They
would be received weeks or months after the episode
inquired into, provided that they were made under
those circumstances. They may utterly fail of comply-
ing with the rule of res gestae,, and still be admissible
24 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1078.
SRESTATEMENT, AGENCY sec. 289, comment d; 6 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1756a.
- Hackney v. Dudley, 216 Ala. 400, 113 So. 401 (1927) RESTATE-
MENT, AGENCY sec. 288, commentb.
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upon the entirely different foundation. It is misleading
and incorrect, manifestly, to hold that, before the
declarations of an agent can be received, they must be
shown to have been both a part of the res gestae and
within the course of his employment. They may have
been either or both, and admissible for that reason." '
It is, perhaps, unfortunate, that along with other uses of the
phrase res gestae it has found such wide popularity in this sort of
situation where it is used both as a rule of agency and of evidence.
In the words of Professor Wigmore, " it invites the confusion
of one rule with another and thus creates uncertainty as to the
limitations of both. It ought therefore wholly to be repudiated, as
a vicious element in our legal phraseology." -
GEORGE MUEHLENKAMP
151 S.C. 391, -, 149 S.E. -111, 115 (1929).
' 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1767.
